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S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 DJIBOUTI 001425

SIPDIS  
STATE FOR AF, AF/E, AND AF/RSA  
LONDON, PARIS, ROME FOR AFRICA-WATCHER  
AFRICOM AND CJTF-HOA FOR POLAD

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1.(S) SUMMARY. Meeting with visiting AF DAS Wycoff following the conclusion of the December 7-8 IGAD ministerial on Somali and Sudan, Foreign M

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PIRACY AND TERRORISM: SYMPTOMS OF SOMALIA'S CRISIS  
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2.(C) On December 9, visiting AF Deputy Assistant Secretary Wycoff, accompanied by Ambassador and DCM, met with Foreign Minister Mahmoud Ali Yc

3.(C) In response to DAS Wycoff's overview of USG policy on Somalia, FM Youssouf stated that terrorism and maritime piracy were symptoms of a c

4.(C) Youssouf said that according to Kenyan FM Wetangula, some 176 pirate attacks on commercial vessels (off the coast of Somalia) had generat

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DJIBOUTI 00001425 002 OF 004 PUSHING THE TFG TO PROVIDE SERVICES AND SECURITY  
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5.(C) The multiple components to the Somalia crisis required multiple, concurrent lines of effort, Youssouf said. The GODJ was privately pressu  
-- such as security and water - in order to build credibility among Somalia's population. FM Youssouf said that the previous day (December 8),

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PUBLIC DIPLOMACY: A WEAKNESS OF THE TFG  
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6.(C) DAS Wycoff reviewed USG support for Somalia and the TFG, including the provision of technical support to bolster the TFG's public diplome

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MILITARY SUPPORT FROM ALGERIA  
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7.(C) In his meeting with the TFG FM, Guelleh had also underscored the strategic necessity of the TFG holding areas liberated from al-Shabaab.

8.(S) FM Youssouf stated that Algeria was providing 30 tons of arms to the TFG; the shipment was currently in Dire Dawa (Ethiopia), and would a  
10.The TFG had previously considered delivery by road, but was concerned about theft. Wycoff urged that care be taken in handing over the arms

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TFG CAN WORK WITH ASWJ AND PUNTLAND, BUT NOT AL-SHABAAB  
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9.(C) DAS Wycoff reviewed the USG approach to the TFG. The U.S. would continue support of Djibouti's effort to train additional TFG troops, but

10.(C) FM Youssouf said he was pleased to observe that the USG and GODJ shared the same assessment and goals regarding Somalia. He hailed the s

11.(C) FM Youssouf concurred that the TFG would generate political gains by taking in the ASWJ. The TFG had signed an agreement with the ASWJ,  
-- a demand that could not be met, as President Sharif could not commit to pay them all salaries.

12.(C) Noting that some Arab states had called for negotiations with Hassan Dahir Aweys, FM Youssouf commented that while Eritrea backed Aweys,

13.(C) As for Puntland and Somaliland, Youssouf said one could envision a future political framework for Puntland (e.g., a federal system). How

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SUB-CLAN DYNAMICS WITHIN THE HAWIYE -----

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14.(C) Questioned about internal dynamics of the Hawiye clan, FM Youssouf observed that whereas in the past the Hawiye had engaged in a power s  
-- Hawiye from the most "anarchic" rural areas, who had never before lived in urban areas, but who looted cities, had a "kill or be killed" phi  
-- the business community, who controlled the ports and Somalia's fishing fleet, and who fought against the warlords, with their own militia ar  
-- farmers on previously state-controlled farms, who had continued for several years to export bananas internationally. Generally, Hawiye/Abgal

15.(C) These three groups, Youssouf continued, maintained a rough equilibrium for many years. U.S. intervention in 2006, during which the USG a

16.(C) The "backbone" of Somali behavior and conflict remained clan-based, Youssouf said, as illustrated by the in-fighting among Somali subcl

17. (C) Questioned about possible international mediation support for internal Somali dialogue, such as the use of African mediators or negoti

18. (C) COMMENT. An ethnic Afar within the majority ethnic Somali Djiboutian government, Foreign Minister Youssouf often is more outspoken the